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A FREQUENT RECURRENCE TO
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES: INDIVIDUAL
RIGHTS, FREE GOVERNMENT, AND THE
WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTION
Brian Snure
Abstract: Article 1, section 32, of the Washington State Constitution provides for a
"recurrence to fundamental principles" as a means of protecting individual rights and free
government. Since the adoption of the constitution in 1889, section 32 has been used
infrequently by Washington's legal community. This Comment examines the role of sec-
tion 32 in constitutional analysis by distilling four fundamental principles from the struc-
ture of the state constitution and the historical and legal environment existing in 1889.
From these principles, this Comment concludes that the framers of the Washington Con-
stitution intended that section 32 be used to expand the scope of individual rights pro-
tected by the constitution.
The Washington State Constitution contains a rarely-used tool for
the protection and expansion of individual rights. This tool, the con-
cluding section of the Declaration of Rights,' states:
A frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is essential to the
security of individual right and the perpetuity of free government. 2
Section 32 is composed of four basic elements: frequent recurrence,3
fundamental principles, individual rights, and free government. Sec-
tion 32 designates fundamental principles as the means to secure indi-
vidual rights and perpetuate free government. As an abstract
proposition, however, section 32 offers little guidance to the practi-
tioner. To effectively incorporate section 32 into Washington jurispru-
dence, practitioners need to understand the fundamental principles
that define the scope of individual rights and free government. Once
the term "fundamental principles" is given substance, and its relation
to individual rights and free government is identified, section 32 can be
more extensively incorporated into Washington jurisprudence.
This Comment attempts to provide substance to section 32 through
an historical approach. Part I examines the historical environment
and legal theories existing in Washington in 1889 and their relation to
the contents of the state constitution. Part I also briefly notes the lim-
I. WASH. CONST. art. I; Washington's Declaration of Rights serves a purpose similar to the
United States Constitution's Bill of Rights. See infra part I.C.1.
2. WASH. CONsT. art. I, § 32.
3. Frequent recurrence is interpreted throughout this Comment as a general admonition to
constantly return to fundamental principles.
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ited use of section 32 and the associated absence of a balanced histori-
cal approach to section 32 in the Washington judiciary. From this
body of evidence, four fundamental principles are identified: liberty,
democracy, natural law, and federalism. Part II analyzes the manner
in which these principles fulfill section 32's mandate to secure individ-
ual rights and perpetuate free government.
I. THE HISTORICAL AND LEGAL BACKGYR.OUND TO
SECTION 32
Washington's citizens were poised at a crossroad of change when
they drafted their constitution. A crossroad between the industrial age
of robber barons and the rural frontier of the rugged individual,
between the future and the past. In the ten years prior to the 1889
Constitutional Convention, Washington Territory evolved from a wil-
derness populated by 75,000 settlers, cut off by a month's travel time
from the nation's capital, to a rapidly growing state of 350,000, linked
by a three-day train ride to the eastern seaboard.4
The delegates at the 1889 Constitutional Convention5 faced two
major challenges stemming from the territory's rapid transformation.
First, Washington Territory experienced government corruption. Sec-
ond, private corporate power grew tremendously over the latter half of
the nineteenth century, bringing both progress and problems to Wash-
ington. The delegates addressed the turbulent changes wrought by
these forces by protecting individual rights with a broadly phrased
Declaration of Rights, and through specific constitutional restrictions
on both governmental and private power.6 Additionally, the framers
removed traditional powers from the legislative branch and placed
democratic checks on all three branches, legislative, executive, and
judicial.7 The parameters of these responses contribute to understand-
ing the fundamental principles embraced by the constitution, and the
manner in which the principles were intended to secure individual
rights and perpetuate free government.
4. DOROTHY 0. JOHANSEN, EMPIRE OF THE COLUMBIA 316-32, 507 (2d ed. 1967).
5. The delegates represented a wide cross section of citizens including farmers, bankers,
lawyers, editors, and merchants. See, e.g., id. at 339.
6. See infra part I.C.
7. See infra part I.C.
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A. The Historical Context: Government Tyranny and Corporate
Abuses
Washington's citizens feared governmental tyranny, a tyranny they
generally identified with the legislative branch.8 The settlers, who
were primarily immigrants from other states, had extensive experience
with and knowledge of legislative abuses.9 In addition, Washington
Territory itself experienced legislative abuses. 1° In 1862-63, the legis-
lature reportedly passed no general laws, but enacted more than 150
pieces of special legislation for the benefit of 'private interests against
the general welfare."11 The delegates to the Constitutional Conven-
tion carried these experiences with them; one delegate remarked that if
a stranger were to step into the convention "he would conclude that
we were fighting a great enemy and that this enemy is the
legislature."12
While the legislature may have been the enemy, governmental cor-
ruption also existed in the executive and judicial branches. Washing-
ton's governors were criticized for abusing their patronage powers. 13
Although Washington's citizens respected the level of justice provided
by the judiciary, they vocally criticized the judiciary because of absen-
tee judges, political manipulations, and the lack of local control over
appointments. 14
The presence of powerful corporations in Washington was often at
the root of the governmental corruption.15 The late nineteenth cen-
tury in America was an era of rapidly increasing concentrations of
8. Lebbeus J. Knapp, The Origin of the Constitution of the State of Washington, 4 WASH.
HIST. Q. 227, 228 (1913) (Knapp's article is based in part on information obtained from
interviews with delegates to the constitutional convention); Francis N. Thorpe, Recent
Constitution Making in the United States, 2 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Scx. 145, 160
(1891).
9. James L. Fitts, The Washington Constitutional Convention of 1889 28-29 (1951)
(unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Washington) (citing TACOMA DAILY LEDGER, July 19,
1889; PORTLAND MORNING OREGONIAN, July 16, 17, 1889); JOHANSEN, supra note 4, at 351.
10. Wilfred J. Airey, A History of the Constitution and Government of Washington Territory
207-21 (1945) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Washington).
11. Id. at 210 (citing WASH. STANDARD, Feb. 6, 1864). In 1879, Governor Ferry criticized
the legislature for passing a "crude jumble of conflicting and inconsistent laws, which are
incapable of being intelligently construed .... " Elisha P. Ferry, Speech to the Seventh Biennial
Session of the Legislative Assembly, October 6, 1879, in MESSAGES OF THE GOVERNORS OF THE
TERRITORY OF WASHINGTON TO THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY, 1854-1889, at 205-07 (Charles
M. Gates ed., 1940) [hereinafter MESSAGES OF THE GOVERNORS].
12. Knapp, supra note 8, at 265.
13. Airey, supra note 10, at 180-86.
14. CHARLES H. SHELDON, A CENTURY OF JUDGING: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE
WASHINGTON SUPREME COURT 17 (1988); Airey, supra note 10, at 272, 290-93.
15. Airey, supra note 10, at 209-12.
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wealth in the hands of relatively few individuals.1 6 Notably, Washing-
ton would probably not have contemplated statehood in 1889 if it had
not benefitted from the economic growth, and associated population
increase, that corporate wealth had provided.1 7
Numerous problems, however, also accompanied the expansion of
corporate power in Washington. Chapters of national third-party
political organizations such as the Grange, the Farmers Alliance, and
the Knights of Labor sprang up in Washington Territory, partly in
response to the expansion of corporate power."8  These organizations
feared that uncontrolled concentrations of capital were threatening
social stability and individual freedoms throughout the country. 19 For
instance, the populist-minded Washington State Grange lashed out at
the "money Kings of the East," the trusts and monopolies that "were
oppressing the laborer and robbing agriculture of its just rewards."20
The Grange's concerns were not imagined;21 Washington's citizens
had a history of conflict with corporations, primarily railroads.22
Excessive freight rates charged by railroad monopolies plagued Wash-
ington's farmers.2 3 The territorial legislature's failure to set railroad
rates further angered farmers.24
16. JAMES W. HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-
CENTURY UNITED STATES 71-72, 81-85 (1956).
17. MARY W. AVERY, WASHINGTON: A HISTORY OF THE EVERGREEN STATE 200-01
(1965).
18. Carlos A. Schwantes, Protest in a Promised Land: Unemployment Disinheritance, and the
Origin of Labor Militancy in the Pacific Northwest, 1885-1886, 1982 W. Hisr. Q. 373, 377;
Harriet P. Crawford, Grange Attitudes in Washington, 1889-1896, 30 PAC. N.W. HIST. Q. 243
(1939); Stephen H. Peters, The Populists and the Washington Legislature 1893-1900 2-3 (1967)
(unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Washington).
19. HURST, supra note 16, at 85-86.
20. Journal of Proceedings, 1891, 3RD ANN. SESSION OF THE WASH. ST. GRANGE 9-10.
21. See Gordon B. Ridgeway, Populism in Washington, 39 PAC. N.W. HISr. Q. 284-91
(1948); Avery, supra note 17, at 214.
22. Railroads were not the only culprits. Timber companies also came into conflict with
Washington's citizens. See generally RICHARD WHITE, LAND USE, ENVIRONMENT, AND
SOCIAL CHANGE: THE SHAPING OF ISLAND COUNTY, WASHINGTON 92 (1980) (paraphrasing
PUGET SOUND ARGUS March 20, 1879: "Logging was wasteful; only the best timber was taken,
the rest was left to rot or burn; lumbermen bled Washington dry for the benefit of San Francisco
23. Ridgeway, supra note 21, at 288; Peters, supra note 18, at 2.
24. See Eugene Semple, Speech to the Eleventh Biennial Session of the Legislative Assembly,
October 9, 1887, in MESSAGES OF THE GOVERNORS, supra note 11, at 271-72; Crawford, supra
note 18, at 249-50; Ridgeway, supra note 21, at 288-89. Distrust of the railroads also emanated
from the large land grant Congress gave to the Northern Pacific Railroad in 1870. See 17 CONG.
REC. 7562 (1886) (statement of Rep. Voorhees requesting restoration of certain railroad lands to
public domain); JOHANSEN, supra note 4, at 308; Crawford, supra note 18, at 253-54.
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Laborers and labor sympathizers expressed additional distrust and
anger toward the growth of corporations.25 A great deal of this anger
stemmed from the conditions and disturbances in the mining camps
around the state.26 In 1886 and 1889, violence broke out in Roslyn
and Newcastle when mining companies hired armed guards to thwart
striking miners.27 Dangerous working conditions faced by industrial
workers around the state led to requests for constitutional provisions
requiring the legislature to enact health and safety laws.28
Despite citizens' demands that corporate power be controlled by the
constitution, 29 the framers had a vested interest in encouraging corpo-
rate growth within the state.3" The railroads increased Washington's
wealth and population tremendously.3" The framers understood that
economic prosperity would be threatened if corporations were driven
from the state.3 2 Thus, one of the primary tasks of the convention was
to efficiently protect individual rights without discouraging corporate
growth.
B. Legal Context: The Unwritten Constitution and Natural Rights
The relation between individual rights, the growth of corporate
power, and section 32 is further explained by the development of nine-
teenth-century constitutional law theories, particularly natural law.
The idea that behind every written constitution there resides an
unwritten constitution, based in part on natural rights, had long been
a part of constitutional theory when the Washington Constitution was
25. See THE JOURNAL OF THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, 1889
58, 66 (Beverly Rosenow ed., 1962) [hereinafter JOURNAL]; JOHANSEN, supra note 4, at 348-50;
Schwantes, supra note 18, at 374.
26. JOHANSEN, supra note 4, at 348-50.
27. Id. at 349-50; Fitts, supra note 9, at 27.
28. JOURNAL, supra note 25, at 58-59, 66-67. Additional proposals called for laws
guaranteeing just compensation for labor performed. Id. at 58. The laborers' demands were
partially included in the constitution. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 35. ("The legislature shall pass
necessary laws for the protection of persons working in mines, factories and other employments
dangerous to life or deleterious to health; and fix pains and penalties for the enforcement of the
same.").
29. Fitts, supra note 9, at 9.
30. Knapp, supra note 8, at 240. The conflict between protecting citizens from corporate
abuse and the economic pressures corporations placed on the delegates is apparent in the debates
over the Railroad and Transportation Commission. The section authorizing such a commission
was initially adopted, but after the railroad lobby made it clear to the delegates that the
commission would prevent the completion of railroads in their own counties, the section was
dropped. Airey, supra note 10, at 491-92; Fitts, supra note 9, at 106-16.
31. Elisha P. Ferry, Address to the Fourth Biennial Session of the Legislative Assembly,
October 9, 1873 in MESSAGES OF THE GOVERNORS, supra note 11, at 174.
32. JOURNAL, supra note 25, at 733; Knapp, supra note 8, at 240.
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created."a George Turner, who proposed section 32, viewed the exist-
ence of the unwritten constitution as a "higher, but none the less real
branch of American constitutional law."34 Turner recognized what
many others of his day also believed; constitutional interpretation
often required a return to natural law principles beyond the four cor-
ners of the constitution.35
Two conflicting concepts of natural rights36 were available to the
framers in 1889, one focusing on personal liberty and one focusing on
economic interests. Both concepts were grounded. in an amorphous
body of natural law principles that included the right to personal
security, the right of personal liberty, and the absolute right to prop-
erty.37 The primary difference in the two concepts was the function
natural rights served,38 the protection of individual rights or the pro-
motion of laissez-faire economics.39
In revolutionary America, natural rights were most often expressed
in terms of individual rights.4" For example, Thomas Jefferson
emphasized the individual's unalienable right to "Life, Liberty and the
pursuit of Happiness" in the Declaration of Independence.4 1 Natural
33. See CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, THE UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES (New York, G.P. Putnam's Sons 1890); FRANCIS LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL
HERMENEUTICS 310 (St. Louis, F.H. Thomas & Co. 1880).
34. 32 CONG. REc. 783, 785 (1899) (statement of Sen. Turner against United States
imperialism in the Philippines).
35. Id. at 789.
36. The use of the term natural rights in place of natural law is ciaracteristic of American
interpretations of natural law. CHARLES G. HAINES, THE REVIVAL OF NATURAL LAW
CONCEPTS 58 (1930).
37. Charles G. Haines, The Law of Nature in State and Federal Judicial Decisions, 25 YALE
L.J. 617, 637; see also DAVID G. RITCHIE, NATURAL RIGHTS: A CRITICISM OF SOME
POLITICAL AND ETHICAL CONCEPTIONS (George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1952) (1894) (Professor
Ritchie writing in 1894 identified additional natural rights: the right to life, toleration, public
meeting and association, freedom of contract, resistance to oppression, equality, and pursuing
and obtaining happiness).
38. W. Lair Hill implicitly recognized this distinction and brought it to the attention of the
delegates in his essay on natural rights. Hill commented on the growing difficulty in finding any
common ground when the issue of the natural right of property is beiny discussed. W. Lair Hill,
Washington: A Constitution Adapted to the Coming State, 8-9 (typed manuscript, copied from
THE OREGONIAN (Portland), July 4, 1889, at 9 available at the University of Washington Law
Library). Hill's constitution served as the working draft for the delegates at 1889 convention.
Arthur S. Beardsley, The Sources of the Washington Constitution as Found in the Constitutions of
the Several States, in CONSTrrTIoNS OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF THE STATE OF
WASHINGTON app. (Belle Reeves ed., 1955).
39. Economic laissez-faire is the doctrine that the economy will run most efficiently if
governmental interference is kept to a minimum.
40. See HAINES, supra note 36, at 53.
41. Id. at 52-54.
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rights during the revolutionary era served as an idealistic doctrine, the
primary purpose of which was to safeguard individual rights.42
In the late nineteenth century the concept of natural rights was
transformed by state and federal judiciaries, using concepts such as
due process and liberty of contract, into a tool for promoting a laissez-
faire economy.43 By 1889, instead of preserving life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness, natural rights primarily served as a conservative
check on the progressive measures emanating from state legislatures in
response to the rapidly advancing industrial age.' Often this use of
natural rights resulted in the expansion of corporate power at the
expense of social progress and individual rights.45
C. The Washington State Constitution
Washington's constitution reflects the influence of the historical and
legal forces of the late nineteenth century and responds to those forces
by incorporating various fundamental principles within its text and
structure. The constitution exhibits three basic structural characteris-
tics. First, it emphasizes the protection of individual rights. Second,
the constitution is legislative; it resolves specific problems with consti-
tutional provisions instead of leaving the problems for future legisla-
tive action. Third, it contains a democratic element designed to check
and balance the three traditional branches of government.
L The Constitution and Individual Rights
At the heart of the Washington Constitution is the emphasis on pro-
tecting individual rights. Washington, like other states, begins its con-
stitution with a Declaration of Rights. The Declaration of Rights sets
the tone for Washington's government by proclaiming the paramount
purpose of government; "governments ... are established to protect
and maintain individual rights."" The Declaration of Rights then
lists twenty-seven rights ranging from traditional legislative restric-
tions, such as the prohibition of bills of attainder and ex post facto
laws,4' to specific proclamations of individual liberty, including a right
42. Id. at 217, 220.
43. Id. at 104-40, 211-13; BENJAMIN F. WRIGHT, JR., AMERICAN INTERPRETATIONS OF
NATURAL LAW 298-99 (1931).
44. HAINES, supra note 36, at 220.
45. Id. at 157-58, 223.
46. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 1.
47. Id. §23.
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to privacy,48 and a right to speak freely on all sutjects.4 9 Section 32
concludes the Declaration of Rights by reaffirming the paramount
purpose-protecting individual rights.
Section 32 had historical precedents, but the precise language incor-
porated in section 32 was unique to the Washington Constitution. 50
Constitutional admonitions to heed fundamental principles originated
in the first American Declaration of Rights written by George Mason
in 1776.51 By 1889, nine states had adopted similar provisions.5 2 Sec-
tion 32, however, differs from its predecessors in other states.53 Wash-
ington did not limit itself to returning to fundamental principles "of
the constitution" as did Massachusetts and New Hampshire.54 In
addition, unlike other states, Washington used section 32 to ensure the
"security of individual right." The connection of fndamental princi-
ples with individual rights was unique to the Washington State Consti-
tution.55 Section 32's emphasis on individual rights is consistent with
and contributes to Washington's constitutional commitment to the
protection of individual rights.
The emphasis on individual rights reflected in section 32, and in the
Declaration of Rights in general, is also consistent with the principles
of federalism existing in 1889.56 The Federal Bill of Rights, in 1889,
protected individuals from the actions of the federal government, but
48. Id §7.
49. Id §5.
50. See Elliott IL Ohannes, A Modest Discourse on the Origins and Meanings of Article One,
Section Thirty-Two of the Washington State Constitution (Nov. 20, 1989) (unpublished student
paper on fie with the Washington Law Review) (comparing Washington's fundamental principles
provision with its predecessors).
51. VA. CONST. art. I, § 15 ("Qualities necessary to preservation of free government.-That
no free government, nor the blessings of liberty can be preserved to any people, but by a firm
adherence to justice, moderation, temperance, frugality, and virtue; by frequent recurrence to
fundamental principles").
52. ILL. CONsT. of 1870, art. II, §20; MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. 19; N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 38;
N.C. CONST. art. I, §35; OHIO CONST. of 1802, art. VIII, § 18 (repealed 1851); VA. CONST. art. I,
§ 15; VT. CoNsT. ch. I, art. 18; W. VA. art. III, §20; Wis. CONST. art. 1, §22. Of the other three
states adopting constitutions in 1889 only South Dakota included a fundamental principles
provision. S.D. CONST. art. VI, §27. Since 1889, Arizona and Utah have adopted fundamental
principles provisions both of which are almost identical to Washington's. ARIZ. CONST. art. 2,
§1; UTAH. CONST. art. 1, §27.
53. See Ohannes, supra note 50.
54. MAss. CONsT. pt. 1, art. 19; N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 38 (both provisions call for "a
frequent recurrence to the fundamental principles of the constitution .... ).
55. Beardsley, supra note 38 at x (even Wisconsin and Illinois, from which Beardsley believes
Washington borrowed section 32, did not mention individual rights).
56. Judge Cooley, writing in 1880, defined federalism as a system in which "the nation is
possessed of supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable power in respect to certain subjects
throughout all the States, while the States have the like unqualified power, within their respective
limits in respect to other subjects." THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF
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not from the actions of state governments.57 The protection of indi-
vidual rights remained, as it had been since the colonial era, primarily
a function of state constitutions.5 8
2. A Legislative Constitution
In response to the troubled record of Washington's territorial legis-
lature,5 9 the framers addressed numerous issues with constitutional
provisions, issues traditionally left for the legislature to resolve.' The
legislative character of the constitution was particularly prevalent in
the regulations placed on corporations. 61 The Declaration of Rights
also includes specific restrictions on corporations 2.6  The framers'
reluctance to entrust future legislatures with these traditionally legisla-
tive decisions was typical of state constitutions in the late 1800s. 63
3. A Democratic Constitution
The Washington Constitution, in addition to being legislative in
nature, also contains democratic checks on the legislative, executive,
and judicial branches of the state government. Unlike the Federal
Constitution, the state constitution delegates numerous decisions to
the voters. For example, the framers removed the majority of state
administrative officials from the patronage rolls and placed them
before the voters.6 The framers also adopted an elected judiciary,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 21-22 (Boston, Little Brown & Co. 1880). One subject traditionally
reserved to the states was the protection of individual rights. Id.
57. See, eg., id at 18; William J. Brennan, Jr, State Constitutions and the Protection of
Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L. REv. 480, 493 (1977).
58. Hans A. Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bills of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L.
REV. 379, 380-81 (1980).
59. See supra notes 8-12 and accompanying text.
60. Knapp, supra note 8, at 228; Thorpe, supra note 8, at 160-61; see, eg., WASH. CONST. art.
VIII (establishing parameters for public indebtedness); iad, art. II, §24 (preventing legislature
from authorizing lotteries and granting divorces); id, art. XVI (controlling disposition of school
and granted lands); id, art. XII (controlling non-municipal corporations).
61. See, e-g., WASH. CONST. art. XII, §§ 14 (repealed 1977), 16, 22 (prohibiting formation of
trusts and monopolies); id, art. XII, § 6 (prohibiting issuance of watered stock); id, art. II, § 33
(repealed 1965), ("The ownership of lands by aliens, other than those who in good faith have
declared their intention to become citizens of the United States, is prohibited in this state .. ");
id, art. II, §28 (prohibiting legislature from granting special privileges); id, art. II, §39, art. XII,
§20 (prohibiting government officials from accepting free transportation passes).
62. l, art. I, § 16 ("Private property shall not be taken for private use ... ."); id, art. I, §24
(prohibiting formation of private militias).
63. Knapp, supra note 8, at 230; Thorpe, supra note 8, at 161.
64. WASH CONsT. art. III, § 1; see generally Thorpe, supra note 8, at 165. Traditionally, state
constitutions allowed the executive branch to appoint all administrative officers. Professor
Thorpe considered the change to an elective system to be indicative of a triumphant democracy.
677
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rejecting various proposals for an appointed judiciary.65 Additionally,
the framers inserted democratic controls over the purse strings, 66 and
expressed confidence in the people and in the principles of local self-
government by instituting municipal home rule.6 7 The initiative, ref-
erendum, and recall amendments to the state constitution 68 represent
a further extension of the democratic principles adhered to by the
framers. Since 1912, the people of Washington have held the power to
pass laws, reject laws passed by the legislature, and remove elected
officials on their own accord.
. The Use of Section 32 in the Washington Judiciary
No judicial decisions have explored the relation of section 32 to the
historical and legal events that shaped the state constitution. Nor has
the judiciary commented on section 32's origins or its unique emphasis
on individual rights. The use of section 32 by the Washington judici-
ary represents the efforts of a small number of litigators and judges.69
It has been cited in twenty-five judicial opinions, only ten of which
were majority opinions. Three broad themes emerge from the cases
that cite section 32. First, section 32 has been used as a principle of
interpretation. Second, individual judges, often in dissent, have
invoked section 32 as a substantive basis for rights not specified in the
constitution. Finally, section 32 has been cited in dicta and dissenting
opinions as a justification for the rejection of the principle of stare
decisis.70
65. WASH. CONsT. art. IV, § 3.
66. Id. art. VIII, §3 (amended 1965, 1971) (requiring that special elections be held before the
state can incur indebtedness for one-time projects).
67. Id., art. XI, § 10 (amended 1964) (the home rule provision allowed any city with a
population of 20,000 or more to frame its own government, thus transferring to the people
another power traditionally reserved to state legislatures); Michael M. K. Sebree, Comment, One
Century of Constitutional Home Rule: A Progress Report?, 64 WASH. L. REv. 155, 157-59 (1989).
68. WASH. CONST. amend. VII, amend. VIII.
69. Section 32 has appeared in the opinions of 16 separate judges and justices.
70. The use of section 32 in this manner is beyond the scope of the present article. For
examples see: Pennock v. Reeves, 27 Wash. 2d 739, 747, 179 P.2d 961, 965 (1947)
(Schwellenbach, J., concurring); State ex rel Kennedy v. Reeves, 22 Wash. 2d 677, 679, 157 P.2d
721, 722 (1945); State v. McCollum, 17 Wash. 2d 85, 96, 136 P.2d 165, 170 (1943) (Millard, J.,
dissenting), overruled by State v. Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d 686, 674 P.2d 1240 (1983); State v.
Mark, 36 Wash. App. 428, 436, 675 P.2d 1250, 1255 (1984) (Ringold, J.) (addendum opinion).
Section 32 has also been used to justify the rejection of nineteenth century precedents as too
outmoded to form an adequate basis for deciding twentieth century problems. Foote v. Grant,
55 Wash. 2d 797, 806-07, 350 P.2d 870, 876 (1960) (Foster, J., dissenting) (automobiles should
not be governed by horse and buggy laws); Ackerman v. Port of Seattle, 55 Wash. 2d 400, 407,
348 P.2d 664, 665 (1960), overruled by Martin v. Port of Seattle, 64 Wash. 2d 309, 391 P.2d 540
(1964).
678
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Section 32 is most commonly used as an interpretive mechanism.
Section 32, certain judges have argued, requires an historical analysis
of a wide variety of sources to elucidate the purpose and intent behind
various constitutional provisions.71 For example, judges have cited
section 32 as a reason for analyzing the principles supporting the right
to privacy,72 the right to free speech,73 the right to an insanity
defense,74 and the restrictions on search and seizure under the Fourth
Amendment to the Federal Constitution.75
Beyond being an interpretive tool, section 32 is occasionally recog-
nized as a substantive provision." The substantive use highlights the
extensive possibilities section 32 holds for expanding the scope of pro-
tection for individual rights. Two cases provide excellent examples of
the substantive use of section 32. In Southcenter Joint Venture v.
National Democratic Policy Committee,77 the Washington Supreme
Court resolved a conflict between the free speech rights of the
71. Senear v. Daily Journal-Am., 97 Wash. 2d 148, 152, 641 P.2d 1180, 1182 (1982)
(recognizing principle that a case should be decided on "other than constitutional grounds"
when possible); State ex rel Toll Bridge v. Yelle, 61 Wash. 2d 28, 65, 377 P.2d 466, 488 (1962)
(Donworth, J., dissenting) (applying art. 8, §3); Carpenter v. Moore, 51 Wash. 2d 795, 800-01,
322 P.2d 125, 128 (1958) (Finley, J., dissenting) (common law forms of action not a principle of
Washington's jurisprudence); State v. Montgomery, 31 Wash. App. 745, 762, 644 P.2d 747, 757
(1982) (Andersen, C.J., dissenting) (attempting to define the parameters of a disturbance of the
peace).
72. WASH. CONST. art. I, §7; State v. Curran, 116 Wash. 2d 174, 189, 804 P.2d 558, 566
(1991) (Utter, J., dissenting); Bremerton v. Smith, 31 Wash. 2d 788, 800, 199 P.2d 95, 101 (1948)
(Simpson, J., dissenting); McCollum, 17 Wash. 2d at 96, 136 P.2d at 170 (Millard, J., dissenting).
73. State v. Reece, 110 Wash. 2d 766, 790, 757 P.2d 947, 960 (1988) (Utter, J., dissenting).
74. State v. Strasburg, 60 Wash. 106, 113, 110 P. 1020, 1021 (1910).
75. State v. Mark, 36 Wash. App. 428, 436, 675 P.2d 1250, 1255 (1984) (Ringold, J.)
(addendum opinion); State v. Broadnax, 25 Wash. App. 704, 718, 612 P.2d 391, 399 (1980)
(Ringold, J., dissenting), rev'd on other grounds 98 Wash. 2d 289, 654 P.2d 96 (1982).
76. Goodnoe Hills Sch. Dist. v. Forry, 52 Wash. 2d 868, 875, 329 P.2d 1083, 1086 (1958)
(using section 32 in context of principles of local state government); State ex rel Swan v. Jones,
47 Wash. 2d 718, 742, 289 P.2d 982, 996 (1955) (Donworth, J., dissenting) (using section 32 to
establish separation of powers argument); State ex reL McFerran v. Justice Court of Evangeline
Star, 32 Wash. 2d 544, 548, 202 P.2d 927, 929 (1949) (using section 32 to support the right to an
impartial trial before justice of the peace); State ex rel Robinson v. Fluent, 30 Wash. 2d 194, 240,
191 P.2d 241, 267 (1948) (Simpson, J., dissenting) (using section 32 to establish separation of
powers argument); Wheeler Sch. Dist. v. Hawley, 18 Wash. 2d 37, 38, 137 P.2d 1010, 1015
(1943) (using section 32 in context of principles of local state government); State ex rel Short v.
Hinkle 116 Wash. 1, 12, 198 P. 535, 538 (1921) (Holcomb, J., dissenting) (using section 32 to
argue in favor of judicial review and for recognition of separation of powers), overruled by State
ex reL Robinson v. Reeves, 17 Wash. 2d 210, 135 P.2d 75 (1943); State ex rel. Mullen v. Howell,
107 Wash. 167, 171, 181 P. 920, 922 (1919) (using section 32 to establish separation of powers
argument); State v. Espinoza, 51 Wash. App. 719, 722, 754 P.2d 1287, 1288 (1988) (using section
32 to support the right to an impartial trial before court commissioner) (citing McFerran, 32
Wash. 2d 544, 202 P.2d 927) rev'd, in part, en banc, State v Espinoza, 112 Wash. 2d 819, 774
P.2d 1177 (1989).
77. 113 Wash. 2d 413, 780 P.2d 1282 (1989).
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National Democratic Policy Committee (NDPC) and the private
property rights of the owners of Southcenter Mall. NDPC attempted
to distribute literature and solicit contributions inside the Mall despite
the Mall's policy against allowing groups to solicit contributions. The
Southcenter majority rejected the free speech claims of the NDPC by
applying the state action doctrine78 to Washington's free speech
clause.79 The majority held that the Declaration. of Rights applied
only to actions against the state.80
Justice Utter, concurring in result only, used section 32 to criticize
the majority's application of the state action doctrine to the state con-
stitution. 1 Utter argued that section 32 was evidence of the framers'
belief in natural law,82 a belief existing prior to the state and, therefore,
"incongruous" with state action. 83 Utter's concurrence recognized
that section 32 can be used as a substantive basis far the protection of
individual rights. In this instance, section 32 expanded the scope of
constitutional protections to cover infringements of individual rights
by private actors.
Section 32 was also recognized as a substantive provision in Dennis
v. Moses where the court related section 32 to natural law principles. 4
In Dennis, the supreme court assessed the constitutionality of a statute
restricting a mortgagee's right of recovery to the value of the property
mortgaged. 5 The court objected to the statute, in part because it dis-
couraged loans to individuals with good credit but small amounts of
property. 86 In order to overturn the statute, the court used section 32
to construct a constitutionally-based right of contract and private
property.87 The statute in question, the court concluded, was "void as
being an undue restraint upon the liberty of the citizen affecting his
property rights."8 8 Property rights, aside from the eminent domain
78. Under the state action doctrine, individual rights are only protected from infringement by
actions instigated by the state, not from the actions of private parties. See generally The Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); Robert F. Utter, The Right to Speak Write, and Publish Freely:
State Constitutional Protection Against Private Abridgement, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 157,
159 (1985).
79. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 5.
80. Southcenter, 113 Wash. 2d at 422-23, 780 P.2d at 1286-87.
81. Id. at 439-40, 780 P.2d at 1294-95.
82. Id.; see also infra part II.C (establishing relation between section 32 and natural law).
83. Southcenter, 113 Wash. 2d at 439-40, 780 P.2d at 1295.
84. Dennis v. Moses, 18 Wash. 537, 571, 52 P. 333, 339 (1898).
85. Id. at 568, 52 P. at 338.
86. Id. at 569, 52 P. at 338.
87. Id. at 571-77, 52 P. at 339-41.
88. Id. at 577, 52 P. at 341.
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provision," and contract rights are not enumerated in the text of the
constitution. The court in Dennis, however, incorporated these natu-
ral law principles through the fundamental principles of section 32.
II. THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF SECTION 32
Despite the possibilities section 32 offers for the protection of indi-
vidual rights, as suggested in Southcenter and Dennis, Washington
jurisprudence has yet to witness the development of a consistent
approach to section 32. By its own dictates, section 32 will provide
effective protection to individual rights and free government only if
practitioners and judges can provide substance to the phrase "funda-
mental principles." The framers expressed fundamental principles
both in the enumerated principles of the Declaration of Rights and
through the general structure of the constitution. The following anal-
ysis focuses on four principles: liberty, democracy, natural law, and
federalism. This section explains how these principles are incorpo-
rated into the constitution and how, in conjunction with section 32,
they can contribute to the protection and enhancement of individual
rights and free government.
A. Fundamental Principle: Liberty
The Washington State government was founded with the express
purpose of protecting and maintaining individual rights." The origins
and unique language of section 32 emphasizes the framers' commit-
ment to the liberty interests of individuals.91 In order to enhance and
expand individual liberty the framers included in the constitution the
necessary mechanisms for protecting individual rights from both gov-
ernmental infringements and from the threats posed by private institu-
tional power. 92
In 1889, threats to individual rights and free government came from
both corporate and governmental powers.93 In attempting to respond
to the threat posed by corporate power the framers placed themselves
in a difficult position. Their constituents demanded that individual
rights not be sacrificed in favor of corporations or private specula-
tors. 94 The framers, however, had to meet these demands without
89. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 16.
90. Id., art. I, § 1.
91. See supra part I.C.1
92. See infra text accompanying notes 96-115
93. See supra part I.A.
94. Fitts, supra note 9, at 9 (citing PORTLAND MORNING OREGONIAN, May 8, 1889).
Washington Law Review
simultaneously driving necessary corporate capital out of the state.95
The framers responded to the conflicting pressures by building two
levels of protection into the constitution. First, they placed a limited
number of specific constitutional restrictions on corporations. 96 Sec-
ond, the delegates framed a Declaration of Rights that protected indi-
vidual rights from corporate as well as governmental actions.9 7
The specific restrictions on corporations primarily responded to
known corporate abuses.98 The mining disturbances in Eastern Wash-
ington generated a direct prohibition on the formation of private mili-
tias.99 The eminent domain section" ° restricted the power of land
hungry railroads.'0° Finally, the constitution prohibited the corrup-
tive influence of railroads on the legislative branch 02 by prohibiting
the legislature from granting special privileges or immunities to corpo-
rations103 and from accepting free transportation passes.' 4 Because
the framers recognized the need to encourage corporate growth, how-
ever, these provisions were consciously limited in their scope.'0 5
The framers responded to this limitation by creating a Declaration
of Rights that protected individual rights from corporate power. Both
the specific restrictions placed on corporations and the language used
in the Declaration of Rights suggests that the framers believed that
individual rights should be secured from corporate power. The thirty-
two sections of the Declaration of Rights are primarily expressed as
positive declarations of individual rights." 6
Among the individual rights arguably secured from private as well
as governmental infringements is the right of free speech. The original
95. JOURNAL, supra note 25, at 733-34; Knapp, supra note 8, at 240; see also Fitts, supra note
9, at 106-16.
96. See infra text accompanying notes 98-105.
97. See infra text accompanying notes 106-15.
98. These restrictions protected individual rights but did not place too heavy of a burden on
corporations.
99. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 24; see supra notes 26-27.
100. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 16.
101. See supra note 24.
102. See Knapp, supra note 8, at 239.
103. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 12.
104. Id, art. II, §39.
105. The end result of the corporations article was best summed up in an article in the
Spokane Falls Northwest Tribune: "'The feeling toward regulating corporations is changing and
from the talks in the lobbies and around the hotels it is evident that while the rights of the people
will be strongly protected, nothing that will keep capital out of the state will be enacted.'" Fitts,
supra note 9, at 98 (quoting NORTHWEST TRIBUNE (Spokane Falls), Aug. 2, 1889); see also
Knapp, supra note 8, at 239-40.
106. Only three rights enumerated in the Declaration of Rights were expressed solely as
limitations on the power of government. See WASH. CONST. art. I, §§ 8, 12, 23.
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draft of Washington's free speech provision read "that no law shall be
passed restraining the free expression of opinion or restricting the
right to speak, write or print freely on any subject."107 This version of
the right to free speech, similar to the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution, would have prohibited only governmental
infringements. The framers ultimately chose not to establish such a
narrowly defined right, however, as this language was deleted from the
final version. 108 Instead, the framers adopted a broadly phrased provi-
sion, that, by not limiting itself to governmental infringements, also
protected free speech from infringements by corporate power."
Washington's Declaration of Rights also contains a broadly phrased
right to privacy.I 0 The right to privacy forbids an invasion of privacy
without "authority of law."'11 This broad phrasing prohibits inva-
sions of privacy by those not exercising a valid police power of the
state. Corporations, unless specifically granted such powers by the
state, do not exercise police power and thus are prohibited from invad-
ing individual privacy.
Similarly, the declaration that the right to petition and assemble
"shall never be abridged" does not take aim solely at the govern-
ment. 1 2 This provision, similar to section 24,113 was arguably a reac-
tion to the use of armed guards to break mining strikes in Eastern
Washington." 4 In 1889, corporations were as capable of infringing
the right to assemble as was government. 1 5 Thus, the framers evi-
dently believed that individual rights were to be protected from insti-
tutional power, whether governmental or private.
The principle that individual rights are to be protected from corpo-
rate power directly conflicts with the application of the state action
doctrine to the state Declaration of Rights. Under the state action
doctrine, individual rights are only protected from infringements by
actions instigated by the state, not from the actions of private par-
107. Utter, supra note 78, at 172 (citing TACOMA DAILY LEDGER, July 13, 1889) (emphasis
added).
108. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 5 ("Freedom of Speech: Every Person may freely speak, write
and publish on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right.").
109. Utter, supra note 78, at 178-79.
110. WASH. CONST. art. I, §7.
111. Id.
112. Id., art. I, §4.
113. Id., art. I, §24 ("The right of the individual citizen to bear arms in defense of himself, or
the state, shall not be impaired, but nothing in this section shall be construed as authorizing
individuals or corporations to organize, maintain or employ an armed body of men.").
114. See supra notes 26-27.
115. See supra notes 26-27.
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ties.1 16 The framers, however, by adopting section 32, incorporated
the fundamental principle that the Declaration of Rights prohibits
infringements by private as well as state actors, thereby denying the
applicability of the state action doctrine to the Declaration of Rights.
Justice Utter cited section 32, as evidence of the framer's belief in nat-
ural law, to reach a similar conclusion in his concurring opinion in
Southcenter Joint Venture v. National Democratic P9licy Committee. 1 1 7
Thus, by incorporating section 32 into state constitutional jurispru-
dence, practitioners can expand the scope of personal liberty to
include protection from infringements by private as well as state
actors.
B. Fundamental Principle: Democracy
Democratic principles permeate the Washington State Constitu-
tion. 11 The convention halls echoed with the voices of delegates who
were willing "to trust the people but not the Legislature."" 9 Wash-
ington citizens' experiences with governmental corruption120 moved
them to create a government that incorporated democratic checks into
the traditional tripartite system of checks and balances. 2 '
The democratic checks responded to the prevailing distrust of gov-
ernment by placing limitations on all three branches.1 22 The constitu-
tion manifested a distrust of the legislature and pessimism regarding
legislative frugality by requiring special elections before the state could
take on indebtedness.12 Territorial dissatisfaction with the appointed
judiciary 24 resulted in a popularly elected judiciary. The elective judi-
ciary also reflected the belief that the state courts should be held
accountable to more than the judges' consciences. 2  Finally, the
framers gave to the people the power to elect various state officials,
who had traditionally been appointed by the executive.126 Thus, the
balancing of governmental powers in Washington requires a consider-
ation of democratic principles as the democratic checks alter the tradi-
116. See supra note 78.
117. 113 Wash. 2d 413, 439-40, 780 P.2d 1282, 1295 (1989) (Utter, J., concurring); see also
supra text accompanying notes 77-83.
118. See supra part I.C.3.
119. JOURNAL, supra note 25, at 673.
120. See supra part I.A.
121. See supra part I.C.3.
122. See supra part I.C.3.
123. WASH. CONST. art. VIII, §3 (amended 1965, 1971).
124. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
125. See WASH. CONST. art. IV, §3.
126. Id., art. III, § 1.
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tional powers of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. In
essence, the framers created a government based on four, not three,
branches of government. 27
The recognition of a democratic branch in Washington's govern-
ment, through section 32's linkage of fundamental principles with free
government, also fills the gap created by the absence of a separation of
powers article. 28 Two of the primary sources used by the delegates to
draft the 1889 constitution-Washington's 1878 Constitution and W.
Lair Hill's proposed constitution-contained separation of powers
articles.129 The framers' inclusion of democratic checks, however,
altered the functions of the executive, legislative, and judicial
branches13 0 and rendered the traditional separation of powers an
incomplete description of Washington's idea of free government. The
government created by the Washington Constitution requires practi-
tioners and judges to balance and separate the powers of four, not
three, branches. The incorporation of these democratic principles,
pursuant to section 32, appears to be essential to the perpetuity of free
government in Washington. In effect, section 32 provides a substan-
tive basis for each individuals' right to participate in government.
The initiative, referendum, and recall amendments emphasize the
necessity of recognizing the people as a fourth branch of government.
Section 32 was used to recognize the powers of the fourth branch in a
1919 state supreme court decision, State ex rel. Mullen v. Howell. 13 1
The issue in Mullen was whether a referendum would be permitted to
challenge the state legislature's ratification of the prohibition amend-
ment to the Federal Constitution.132 Although the court did not cast
127. The characterization of democratic checks as creating a fourth branch is not meant to
suggest that the framers of the Washington Constitution rejected centuries of political theory by
crafting a completely new philosophy of government. The characterization merely recognizes
that the framers gave the people, in their democratic capacity, a substantial role in the structure
of Washington's government.
128. Similar to Washington's constitution, the Federal Constitution does not contain a
separation of powers article. The federal judiciary, however, has implied its existence. In
contrast, most state constitutions, including those drawn on by the framers of the Washington
Constitution do include specific separation of powers clauses.
129. Hill, supra note 38, art. III at 30; WASHINGTON'S FIRST CONsTITUTION, 1878, AND
PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION art. III, at 64 (Edmond S. Meaney & John T. Condon eds.,
1919) (reprinted from 1918-19 WASH. HIST. Q.) [hereinafter 1878 CONsTrrUTIoN]. The 1878
Constitution represents Washington's first attempt at framing a constitution. The 1878
Constitution was adopted in a general election but statehood was not granted and the 1878
Constitution never took effect. The document was heavily drawn on by the Delegates in 1889.
Beardsley, supra note 38, at iv.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 122-27.
131. State ex rel. Mullen v. Howell, 107 Wash. 167, 171, 181 P. 920, 922 (1919).
132. U.S. CONsT. amend. XVIII (repealed 1933).
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the issue in terms of a conflict between the democratic branch and the
legislative branch, that was precisely the issue. .he fourth branch,
through the referendum, was challenging a legislative act. The court
resolved the issue in favor of the democratic bran.ch. Citing section
32, the court reasoned that the peoples' purpose in amending the con-
stitution with the referendum power was to make the legislature more
responsive to the "popular will." '33 In essence, the court recognized
that the referendum was a valid exercise of power by the democratic
fourth branch.
C. Fundamental Principle: Natural Law
Section 32, in addition to broadening the enumerated rights of the
constitution as reflected in the preceding two sections, also incorpo-
rates natural rights into the state constitution as an additional level of
security for individual rights. The framers chose not to include lan-
guage that limited section 32 to fundamental principles of the constitu-
tion, as did many of section 32's predecessors.1 3 1 In addition, the idea
of the unwritten constitution, 135 together with section 32's unique
combination of fundamental principles with individual rights,'36 sug-
gests that the framers viewed natural rights as another tool for protect-
ing individual fights.
References to natural rights were a traditional component of decla-
rations of rights in state constitutions, 137 yet the framers of Washing-
ton's constitution specifically omitted natural rights language. Both
W. Lair Hills' draft and Washington's 1878 Constitation included nat-
ural rights in their Declarations of Rights. 38 Additionally, the first
draft of Washington's Declaration of Rights proclaimed: "All men are
possessed of equal and unalienable natural rights, among which are
life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness."139 Neither the journals, nor
the newspapers, explain why the language was eventually omitted.
The historical and legal context which shaped Washington's consti-
tution suggests one explanation for the absence of natural rights lan-
guage. The framers were distrustful of corporate and governmental
power.' 4° The framers responded to the distrust with democratic
133. Mullen, 107 Wash. at 172, 181 P. at 922.
134. See supra text accompanying notes 50-55.
135. See supra text accompanying notes 33-35.
136. See supra text accompanying note 55.
137. See WRIGHT, supra note 43, at 183-85.
138. Hill, supra note 38, at 12 (art. I); 1878 CONSTrUTION, supro note 129, at 66 (art. V).
139. JOURNAL, supra note 25, at 51.
140. See supra part I.A.
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checks on government,14 1 and by protecting individual rights from
corporations. 142 By 1889, however, natural rights had largely become
a tool of the courts often associated with the protection of corpora-
tions from progressive social legislation.143 Given the framers' distrust
of corporations, it is possible that they feared natural rights language
would be used in this manner and consequently chose to omit the
potentially troublesome language of natural rights.
The use of natural rights to protect corporations from social legisla-
tion was inconsistent with many of the framers' actions. For example,
the framers gave express constitutional sanction to the legislature to
enact health and safety laws for industrial workers. 1" This provision
permitted legislation similar to the type being overturned by state
courts on a natural rights basis as violating the right of contract
between employee and employer. 145 Additionally, Washington pro-
hibited land ownership by aliens, 141 arguably a violation of the right of
private property being protected by courts across the country. 147 The
constitution also required the enactment of laws regulating transporta-
tion rates,148 a provision affecting the liberty of contract and in viola-
tion of the laissez-faire economic policy fueling court activism.149
Although the framers dispensed with the language of natural rights,
the language they chose for section 32 suggests that they retained the
notion that natural rights should be considered when protecting indi-
vidual rights. Section 32 designates extra-constitutional fundamental
principles as essential to the security of individual rights. 5 ' This
unique choice of language linked natural rights, in the form of funda-
mental principles beyond the constitution, with individual rights. In
effect, by tying fundamental principles together with individual rights
section 32 limits the use of natural rights to the protection of individ-
ual rights.
141. See supra part II.B.
142. See supra part II.A.
143. See supra text accompanying notes 38-46.
144. WASH. CONST. art. II, §35.
145. Haines, supra note 37, at 645-46.
146. WASH. CONST. art. II, §33. This provision was inserted in response to the fears of many
delegates that foreign corporations already owned too much American land and that the land
should be protected for American citizens. JOURNAL, supra note 25, at 549-51.
147. Haines, supra note 37, at 645-46.
148. WASH. CONST. art. XII, § 18.
149. See supra text accompanying notes 38-45.
150. See supra text accompanying notes 50-55.
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Section 32's link of natural rights with individual rights influenced
the court's analysis in Dennis v. Moses. 15 The court rationalized over-
turning a statute restricting the recovery rights of creditors by focus-
ing on the statute's effects on the individual rights of debtors, not in
terms of its effects on creditors. 52 Ironically, by overturning the stat-
ute, individual debtors were deprived of the protection afforded by the
statute. A debtor faced with losing far more than his farm to the
"money kings of the east," 15 3 probably did not consider the decision in
Dennis to be consistent with the protections of individual rights prom-
ised by section 32.
The court's reasoning, however, was faithful to the framers' inten-
tions. The court did not focus on the protection that the statute pro-
vided to debtors; rather the court used section 32 to protect the
individual rights of small landowners and merchants to obtain loans
greater than the value of their property.1 54 The court, by focusing its
attention on the infringement of individual rights, was able to base its
decision, through section 32, on the natural rights of contract and pri-
vate property. 155 Thus, as Dennis suggests, secticn 32 offers practi-
tioners the ability to expand individual rights in Washington through
its incorporation of a substantive body of natural rights.
D. Fundamental Principle: Federalism
The three principles discussed above highlight the fundamental
principle at the heart of section 32; the state constitution, not the Fed-
eral Constitution, is the primary safeguard for Washington citizens'
individual rights. The framers' adoption of a Declaration of Rights
suggests that they considered the state constitution to be the primary
safeguard for individual rights. Indeed, the framers believed the Dec-
laration of Rights was necessary for two primary reasons. First, under
the general principles of federalism, the framers understood that the
Federal Bill of Rights would not protect the citizens of Washington
from the threats posed by state government or corporate power.15 6
Second, the Federal Bill of Rights did not contain the broad protec-
tions that Washington citizens believed the times warranted. 157 The
151. Dennis v. Moses, 18 Wash. 537, 571, 52 P. 333, 339 (1898); see supra text accompanying
notes 84-89.
152. Dennis, 18 Wash at 569, 574, 52 P. at 338, 340.
153. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
154. Dennis, 18 Wash. at 569, 574, 52 P. at 338, 340.
155. Id. at 571-74, 52 P. at 339-40.
156. See supra text accompanying notes 56-58.
157. See infra text accompanying notes 159-61.
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broadly phrased protections of the Declaration of Rights represented
an effort to combat governmental and private institutional power with
tools not present in the Federal Constitution.158 One of the tools, sec-
tion 32, expanded the protections to individual rights by requiring
consideration of the three fundamental principles previously analyzed.
The democratic branch of government, for example, provides an
additional level of protection for individual rights by further checking
the excesses and abuses of the three traditional branches of govern-
ment, legislative, executive, and judicial."5 9 The democratic branch,
however, is recognized only in the state constitution, not the Federal
Constitution. In response to the distrust of corporate power, the fram-
ers adopted a Declaration of Rights that applies to private actors as
well as state action."6 This broad protection is available only under
the state constitution. Finally, not content with the broad protections
specifically enumerated in the constitution, the framers adopted sec-
tion 32 and effectively incorporated natural rights as an ally in the
ongoing fight to secure individual rights.161 Broadening the base of
individual rights through section 32 by including natural rights further
distinguishes the state constitution from the Federal Constitution.
The additional protection that section 32 offers for individual rights
and free government demonstrates the value and the need for inter-
preting the state constitution independently of the Federal Constitu-
tion. 62 The fundamental principles that the framers believed would
secure individual rights and perpetuate free government are expressed
in the history and in the pages of the state constitution. The absence
of a state action requirement, the integral role of natural rights, and
the democratic branch of government all distinguish Washington's
constitution from the Federal Constitution. While the Federal Consti-
tution will undoubtedly still play a role in determining the extent of
civil liberties in Washington, the scope of that role can be determined
only after returning to the fundamental principles reflected in the state
constitution.
158. See supra parts II.A-C.
159. See supra part II.B.
160. See supra part II.A.
161. See supra part II.C.
162. The Washington Supreme Court has recognized the validity of independent state
constitutional analysis. See State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d 54, 720 P.2d 808 (1986); James W.
Talbot, Comment, Rethinking Civil Liberties Under the Washington State Constitution, 66
WASH. L. REV. 1099 (1991).
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III. CONCLUSION
Section 32 requires a frequent recurrence to fundamental principles
for the security of individual rights and the perpetuity of free govern-
ment. These principles, deeply rooted in the history and values of
Washington State, provide substantive rights for the state's citizens. If
practitioners incorporate section 32 into Washington's constitutional
jurisprudence, the end result will be a legal system that is more respon-
sive to the individual rights of the citizens of Washington State. If
section 32 is neglected, individual rights will continue to receive less
protection than the state constitution is capable of providing.
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